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TransAsia Flight 235
• ATR 72-600 aircraft
• Uncommanded feather of 
the right engine 
• Captain reduced throttle of 
the left engine and shut it 
down
• No power at 1,500 feet 
AGL, engine restart 
attempts unsuccessful 
• Uncontrolled stall and crash
• 43 fatalities
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Engine misidentification
• Turboprops: From 1985 to 1997, almost 50% of in-flight engine shutdowns 
involved a shutdown of the working engine (Sallee & Gibbons, 1999)
• Turbofans: From 1958 to 1997, 29% of in-flight engine shutdowns involved a 
shutdown of the working engine (Sallee & Gibbons, 1999)
• Twin-engine helicopters: 40% of interviewed pilots admitted moving the 
throttle of a working engine in emergency in real life/simulator (Wildzunas et 
al., 1999; as cited in Aviation Safety Council, 2016)
4
Dangers of twin-engine propeller aircraft 
operations
• Failed engine creates drag due to the windmilling propeller
• Asymmetric thrust follows, resulting in a significant yaw
• Climb performance loss of up to 80% (Federal Aviation 
Administration, 2016)
5
Identify-Verify-Feather
• Identify: “Dead leg – dead engine”
• Compensate for the yaw by applying rudder
• Dead leg (not pushing the rudder pedal) is on the side of dead (failed) engine
• Verify: Confirm correct identification
• Pull back the throttle of the identified engine
• Expect no change in the direction of flight and engine sound
• Feather the propeller of the failed engine 
Source: (Gardner, Schiff, & Bringloe, 2011)
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Purpose of the study
• Current method is believed to be too resource-demanding 
• An alternative method was proposed and tested 
• The alternative method was based on the visual sensory channel
• Participants flew three flights with simulated engine failures
• Response times and accuracy of identification were measured and 
compared between two groups (Traditional vs Alternative)
7
Hypotheses
• H01: There is no difference in accuracy of engine identification 
between participants using the traditional and the alternative method.
• H02: There is no difference in response time across the three flights 
between participants using the traditional and the alternative method
• H03: There is no difference in average response time for all three 
flights between participants using the traditional and the alternative 
method
8
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Human Capabilities and Limitations
• Stress 
• Stress can affect operator’s judgment and assessment of the situation
• Evidence that conflicts with expectations may be explained away or ignored 
(Kontogiannis & Malakis, 2009)
• Workload
• Increase in workload can impair performance (Casto & Casali, 2013) and lead 
to problems with task prioritization (Morris & Leung, 2007)
• Pilot error can become the source of increased workload (Morris & Leung, 
2007)
• Planning for the increase in workload helps avoid detriments to performance 
(Andre & Heers, 1995)
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Human Capabilities and Limitations
• Attention
• Human brain can handle up to four tasks concurrently without decrease in 
performance (Fisher, 1984; Julesz, 1981; James, 1980; as cited in Strayer & 
Drews, 2007)
• Attention can be influenced by anxiety, making pilot’s gaze behavior more 
chaotic (Allsop & Gray, 2014)
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Haptic vs Visual Sensory Channels
• 80% of information we perceive is visual (Geruschat & Smith, 2010)
• People are more likely to notice visual cues (Hecht & Reiner, 2008) 
over haptic or auditory
• Information coming through the visual channel gets priority even if an 
operator knows that it is less reliable than the haptic channel (Xu, 
O’Keefe, Suzuki, & Franconeri, 2012)
12
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Method
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Materials and Apparatus
• X-Plane 11 flight simulation software
• Engine Status Panel 
• Indicates which engine has failed based on the fuel flow value
• Training video 
• Explained basic concepts and the method of identification of a failed engine
• Pre- and post-flight questionnaires
• Demographics 
• Confidence in correct engine identification
• Three simulated takeoffs
• Flight 1: Left engine failure 30 sec after rotation
• Flight 2: Right engine failure 20 sec after rotation
• Flight 3: Right engine failure 45 sec after rotation
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Procedure
• 50 student pilots who did not have multi-engine rating (MEL) and had not started 
their training were sampled
• Students received $20 for participation
• Participants were assigned to two groups
• Traditional Group 
• Alternative Group
• Participants watched a training video
• Participants flew a practice flight 
• Engine failure was demonstrated
• Participants were given an opportunity to practice the procedure
• Participants performed three takeoffs 
• Engine failure was simulated by failing fuel pumps on the corresponding engine
• Participants were asked to announce verbally which engine had failed and comment aloud 
their actions after the failure
15
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Results
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Results: Demographics
• 42 Males & 8 Females
• Mean age M = 20.22 years (SD = 2.67 years)
• Mode age 18 years
• Average flight experience M = 145.90 hours (SD = 75.45 hours)
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Result: Hypotheses testing
• H01: Difference in accuracy of identification between group
• All participants feathered the correct engine 
• H01 retained
• H02: Difference in response time across flights and between groups
• 2x3 mixed ANOVA within-subject variable test was not significant
• H02 retained
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Result: Hypotheses testing
• H03: Difference in response time between groups
• 2x3 mixed ANOVA between-subjects variable was significant at 
F(1,48) = 10.83, p = 0.002
• Alternative Group (M = 3.09 seconds, SD = 1.84 seconds) was faster at 
identification than Traditional Group (M = 5.09 seconds, SD = 2.43 seconds)
• H03 rejected
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Result: Qualitative data
Do you feel that you identified a failed 
engine correctly for each of the three 
flights? 
Flight 1 Flight 2 Flight 3 
Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Traditional Group 25 0 25 0 23 2 
Alternative Group 25 0 25 0 25 0 
 
Do you feel that you identified a failed 
engine in adequate amount of time during 
each of the three flights? 
Flight 1 Flight 2 Flight 3 
Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Traditional Group 23 2 24 1 24 1 
Alternative Group 24 1 24 1 25 0 
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Participants’ assessment of identification of a failed engine
Results: Suggestions for improvement
21
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Discussion
5
Discussion
• Alternative Group was significantly faster at identifying a failed 
engine than Traditional Group
• Some Traditional Group participants reported using visual cues for 
identification
• Alternative Group participants were generally more confident in 
correct identification
• Alternative Group participants reported being generally less confused 
in regard to which engine was failing
• Traditional Group: M = 2.28, SD = 1.27. Alternative Group: M = 1.84, 
SD = 1.03. 
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Limitations
• The response time was reducing from Flight 1 to Flight 3 for Alternative 
Group
• With more power, there could be a significant difference
• 8 participants (6 in Traditional Group and 2 in Alternative Group) moved 
the wrong throttle initially, but feathered the correct engine propeller
• Increased response time
• Might have hastily moved the throttle
• Possible confusion due to no experience in multi-engine aircraft
• Observing participant actions could help avoiding the issue in future research
• Participant behavior was not consistent
• Did not retract landing gear
• Did not power up
24
Further research
• Perform similar experiment with multi-engine-rated pilots
• Determine how past experience affects the ability to use the new method for 
identification
• Possibly make further changes to the method
• Identify engine parameters most indicative of the failure
• Fuel flow was used, but is not enough
• Several parameters might need to be used
• Examples: Fuel Flow + Exhaust Gas Temperature
25
Suggestions
• Particular benefit to General Aviation
• Reason: Lack of sophisticated systems in GA aircraft
• Reduce risk of human error in emergency situations
• Engine Status Panel can be installed aside from other instruments (to avoid 
clutter)
• Newly-built aircraft are equipped with glass cockpits, hence the panel can be 
shown on a display
26
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Conclusion
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Conclusion
• Currently recommended method of identification might be too 
confusing and resource-demanding
• This is dangerous in case if an engine fails on takeoff (high-workload)
• Using a method based on the visual sensory channel requires less time 
for identification of a failed engine
• A panel with a visual indicator is recommended to be installed in GA 
aircraft to reduce the risk of engine misidentification
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References
Aviation Safety Council (2016). Aviation occurrence report: 4 February, 2015, TransAsia Airways Flight GE235 ATR72-212A, loss of control and crashed into Keelung 
river three nautical miles east of Songshan airport (Report No.: ASC-AOR-16-06-001). Retrieved from Aviation Safety Council website: 
https://www.asc.gov.tw/upload/acd_att/ASC-AOR-16-06-001%20EN.pdf 
Salas, E., Prince, C., Baker, D. P., & Shrestha, L., (1995). Situation awareness in team performance: Implications for measurement and training. Human Factors, 37, 
123-136.
Allsop, J., & Gray, R. (2014).  Flying under pressure: Effects of anxiety on attention and gaze behavior in aviation. Journal of Applied Research in Memory and 
Cognition, 3, 63-71.
Andre, A. D., & Heers, S. T. (1995). Effects of workload preview on task scheduling during simulated instrument flight. The International Journal of Aviation 
Psychology, 5, 5-23. doi:10.1207/s15327108ijap0501_2
Casto, K. L., & Casali, J. G. (2013). Effects of headset, flight workload, hearing ability, and communications message quality on pilot performance. Human Factors, 55, 
486-498. doi:10.1177/0018720812461013 
Federal Aviation Administration (2016). Airplane Flying Handbook. Oklahoma City, OK: Author.
Fisher, D. L. (1984). Central capacity limits in consistent mapping, visual search tasks: Four channels or more?. Cognitive Psychology, 16, 449-484.
Gardner, B., Schiff, B. J., & Bringloe, R. (2011). The Complete Multi-Engine Pilot. Newcastle, WA: Aviation Supplies & Academics
Geruschat, D. R., & Smith, A. J. (2010). Low vision for orientation and mobility. In Wiener, W. R., Welsch, R. L., Blasch, B. B. (Eds), Foundations of orientation and 
mobility (3rd ed., Vol. 1), pp. 63-83. New York, NY: AFB Press
Hecht, D., & Reiner, M. (2008). Sensory dominance in combinations of audio, visual and haptic stimuli. Experimental Brain Research, 193, 307–314. 
doi: 10.1007/s00221-008-1626-z 
Julesz, B. (1981). Figure and ground perception in briefly presented isodipole textures. In M. Kubovy & J. R. Pomerantz (Eds.), Perceptual Organization. Hillsdale,
N.J.: Erlbaum.
Kontogiannis, T., & Malakis, S. (2009). A proactive approach to human error detection and identification in aviation and air traffic control. Safety Science, 47, 693-706.
Morris, C. H., & Leung, Y. K. (2007). Pilot mental workload: How well do pilots really perform? Ergonomics, 49, 1581-1596. doi:10.1080/00140130600857987
Strayer, D. L., & Drews, F. A. (2007). Attention. In Durso, F. T., Nickelsom, R. S., Dumais, S. T., Lewandowsky, S., & Perfect, T. J. Handbook of applied cognition: 
Second edition (29-54). West Sussex, England: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Xu, Y., O'Keefe, S., Suzuki, S., & Franconeri, S. L. (2012). Visual influence on haptic torque perception. Perception, 41(7), 862-870. doi: 10.1068/p7090
29
30
THANK YOU
